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The effectiveness of campaign spending is a hotly contested issue. Much of that 
debate concentrates upon predetermined or assumed campaign periods. Yet, in  a 
party and electoral system such as Britain, parties are continually campaigning. 
Party expenditure may therefore have a constant and cumulative effect. This 
article examines whether increased party spending at the national level is 
electorally significant. It analyses annual data from 1959 to 1994  and concludes 
that there is insufficient consistent evidence wholly to support this proposition. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Herbert Alexander, a prominent writer in the field of political finance, has argued 
that political power is built upon three constituencies: the electoral, the financial and 
the organisational. Money is an element of political power because it buys what is 
not or cannot be volunteered (Adamany & Agree, 1975, p. 3; Alexander, 1984, p. 
3). Moreover, money is the most important constituent because finance also 
dominates the organisational and electoral aspects of political life (Alexander, 1989, 
pp. 10-12). The importance of money in politics is fundamental, for it can affect 
political spending and contributes to debates concerning political equality. Some 
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claim that  money distorts this equality. They argue that since all citizens have an 
equal right to political participation, so all interests should receive financial support 
in proportion to their adherents. The reality is, however, that wealthy groups are 
represented beyond the proportion of their number. Inequalities in money are greater 
than any other inequalities of the resources that go into political life, because money 
can buy virtually all of the resources that are given directly by citizens (Paltiel, 
1981; Adamany & Agree, 1975). Money is essential for the very existence and 
survival of political parties, but debate has tended to suggest that disparities in 
the financial endowment of parties distorts electoral competition in favour of the 
most wealthy party. The logic of this argument is simple - namely that increased 
spending capacity provides parties with greater opportunities to promote 
themselves to voters and the exploitation of such opportunities will result in 
electoral payoffs. Consequently, it is argued that unregulated political finance 
fails to guarantee a level playing field in the competition for power, thus 
undermining the right to equal political participation. 
 
Claims that party expenditure may be electorally significant are based upon the 
idea that money is a constant sum. The implicit assumption is that a resource (in 
this case money) will be used with equal degrees of skill. However, there is a 
good theoretical case to be made against this assumption. For example, if I were 
to give £100 each to three election candidates with the instruction to use that 
money to promote their candidature, it might be that each would choose a 
different manner in which to promote themselves. Candidate A might produce 
1,000 leaflets, Candidate B might produce one large poster and Candidate C 
might spend the money on a loudhailer for his or her  campaign vehicle. Despite 
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the initial sums the same, their electoral impact might not be identical. Money 
would not therefore be a constant sum. Even if all three candidates produced 
1,000 leaflets, there is no guarantee that the leaflets would be equally well 
received or that they would have an equal impact on the vote, since the leaflets 
could be produced with varying degrees of skill. Notwithstanding these 
arguments however, there is some evidence to suggest that party spending does 
have an impact upon electoral outcomes. 
 
COMPARATIVE EVIDENCE 
Jacobson (1980) tests the significance of financial endowment in terms of 
electoral success. Using data from congressional elections in the United States, 
he argues that if money is significant in the electoral prospects of candidates, 
then it will be of greater significance for challengers than for incumbents. All 
other things being equal, voters will favour candidates about whom they have the 
most information. Since incumbents use their office to publicise themselves, 
such candidates should require less publicity (and therefore funds) during an 
election. Moreover, incumbents will be likely to spend less if they feel that their 
re-election is reasonably assured. Conversely a challenger, who has not enjoyed 
the benefits of incumbent publicity, will have greater need for campaign finance 
(Jacobson, 1980, pp. 36-37). As a result, money spent by challengers should have 
a greater electoral impact than that spent by incumbents. Jacobson‟s testing tends 
to confirm his hypothesis. Moreover, whilst his analysis is centred around 
individual candidates in congressional elections, he argues that the incumbency 
effect upon the relative need for campaign expenditure will also be reflected in 
broader terms (Jacobson, 1980, p. 37). 
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Jacobson‟s work has not been without its critics, however. Green and Krasno 
(1988,1990) argue that incumbent spending is more significant than Jacobson 
had claimed and that challenger spending is less significant and subject to 
diminishing returns. Gerber (1998, p.402) also questions Jacobson‟s position. He 
argues firstly, that while incumbents may be well-known and therefore have an 
information advantage, challengers can spend money to address new issues 
which may not be on the established political agenda. Thus, challengers have an 
theoretical advantage of establishing themselves as champions of a particular 
cause. Secondly, campaigning may not only be positive, promoting one‟s own 
cause, but also negative - highlighting damaging information about an opponent. 
Thus incumbents have an advantage where challengers are less well known since 
they have a greater opportunity to shape preferences about that candidate. 
Thirdly, incumbents in theory should be more effective in their spending since 
they will typically be better organised. Finally, Gerber draws upon simple pleas 
to „common sense‟ - if incumbent spending is so futile, why do so many raise 
and spend so much money? This final claim is certainly the least robust of 
Gerber‟s criticisms, since the mere fact that people do something does not prove 
its effectiveness, even if the assumptions of the significance of campaign 
spending may suggest rationality on the part of these candidates. 
 
Gerber (1998, p.401) also questions Jacobson‟s approach by suggesting the idea 
that campaign spending is exogenous is an erroneous assumption. He points out 
that most models of party spending have assumed the exogenous nature of 
spending levels. In fact, Jacobson (1990, p. 335) accepts that his model may not 
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be entirely watertight. In particular, he highlights the fact that the relationship 
between money and electoral popularity may be reciprocal. Thus, there is likely 
to be a relationship between how a candidate is likely to perform on election day 
and how much he or she can raise. In turn, this will affect how much he or she 
can spend, which in turn may affect how well he or she performs electorally.  
 
In Britain there is repeated evidence at constituency level that general election 
party expenditure can influence electoral outcomes (Johnston, 1985; Johnston, 
1986; Johnston & Pattie 1995; Pattie, Johnston & Fieldhouse, 1995). These 
analyses show that on average the Conservatives spend most per constituency 
(Johnston & Pattie, 1995, p. 262) and the greatest proportion of the maximum 
permitted by electoral law (Johnston & Pattie, 1995, p. 263; Pattie, Johnston & 
Fieldhouse, 1995, pp. 971-972). For all parties, increased spending at 
constituency level improves electoral performance within that constituency 
(Johnston & Pattie, 1995, p. 269). That said, the effect is stronger amongst 
challengers than amongst incumbents, where the impact of increased expenditure 
is mixed (Pattie, Johnston & Fieldhouse, 1995, pp. 979-980). This is consistent 
with Jacobson‟s argument that high incumbent spending may be interpreted as a 
sign of electoral weakness, rather than strength since incumbents tend to spend 
more when under a sustained challenge.  
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NATIONAL LEVEL ANALYSIS 
In this article, the intention is to move from examining local and candidate level 
electoral effects to those at national level. Thus, the focus of this analysis will 
differ from the existing literature in three principal respects. First, it will focus 
upon national level spending and national level vote share. Secondly, unlike the 
candidate-based analyses in the work from the United States, this analysis 
focuses upon parties, in a manner similar to Johnston and his colleagues. Thirdly, 
the focus is not simply upon official campaigns, but upon annual levels of 
electoral popularity. Notwithstanding, these differences, however, the analysis 
will attempt to establish whether the findings of these previous studies hold in 
the national environment. 
 
The contention in this article is that party campaigning is something of a 
constant, rather than an activity existing only at certain points of a cycle. Party 
spending will necessarily be linked to this activity. Thus, whilst parties 
concentrate most attention upon General Elections and to lesser extent, the other 
elections occurring during this cycle, they do not only operate and campaign at 
these times. Parties are continually competing to win the support of public 
opinion. To use a sporting analogy, parties are not simply playing friendlies 
between General Elections, they are in the qualifying stages for the World Cup. 
Party expenditure may be seen therefore, as having longer-term impact upon 
electoral choice rather than just a short-term impact at General Elections. 
 
Moreover, continually good party performance, especially at the electoral level, 
will enhance voters‟ opinions of that party when they come to make electoral 
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choices. An analogy would be with a corporation that performed consistently 
well in a variety of markets. Consistent performance would promote consumer 
confidence in that brand. Such confidence in the party will assist in voters‟ 
decision-making. For example, under a Downsian model, should ideological 
distance between parties be such that a voter is unable to make a choice, then the 
voter will judge the credibility of parties to pursue their programmes (Downs, 
1957, pp.41-45; Laver, 1997, pp.99-100).  It is likely that continually good 
performance will contribute to such evaluations of credibility.  
 
Party expenditure at the national level in Britain 
Running a political party is an expensive activity. Competitive political parties 
require funds for three purposes: to fight election campaigns, to maintain viable 
interelection organisations and to provide research and other assistance to the 
leadership and representatives of the party (Paltiel, 1981, p. 139). As the 1966 
Barbeau Committee Report on Canadian Political Finance observed: 
 
 „The elector cannot make a sensible choice unless he is well 
informed. Keeping the electorate well informed means using the 
great communications media: radio, television, newspapers, printed 
flysheets, billboards etc. If these media are to be used well, parties 
and candidates must spend very considerable sums of money. The 
sums are essential expenses in informing the public.‟ (Quoted in 
Ewing, 1992, p. 47) 
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Yet, in order to achieve these aims, political parties require considerable amounts of 
money. In short, politics is an expensive activity and money is indispensable 
(Alexander, 1989, p. 13; Ewing, 1992, p. 61 ;Paltiel, 1981, p. 138; Fisher, 1996a, p. 
200). A regular flow of income is vital for the survival of political parties. This then 
leads to the institutionalisation of political parties and the development and 
maintenance of parties' central bureaucracies (Panebianco, 1988, pp. 58-59). 
 
Panebianco‟s claims are borne out in the British case. Most spending is routine: 
generally constituting around 80% of Conservative and Labour central 
expenditure. Even the 1992 general election year, routine expenditure by the 
Conservatives was far greater than that spent upon campaigning. The second 
point to note is that whilst most campaigning is still undertaken in general 
elections, a significant amount occurs in between. Thus, £2.2 million was spent 
by the Conservatives in the non-general election year 1993/94 and £737,000 by 
Labour; whilst in the European election year of 1994/95, the Conservatives spent 
£4.4 million and Labour £2.5 million. The effect is that constant levels of 
spending will help ensure that parties remain prominent in voters‟ minds. 
 
[Figure 1 About Here] 
 
Figure 1 illustrates levels of real terms central expenditure over the period of the 
analysis. Spending peaks at General Elections and troughs directly afterwards, 
with the peaks and troughs being more pronounced in the case of the 
Conservative Party. Secondly, there is significant spending between General 
Elections. Thirdly, we can see that as at local level, Conservative spending has 
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consistently been above that of Labour, to the extent that until 1974 Conservative 
troughs were higher that Labour peaks. More recently, the spending gap has 
closed somewhat, though Conservative spending in the run-up to the 1992 
General Election was notably high.
2
  
 
[Figure 2 About Here] 
 
Figure 2 gives a clearer indication of the closing spending gap, showing Labour 
expenditure expressed as a percentage of that of the Conservatives. The reference 
line at 100% indicates equal spending. Year on year, the electoral playing field 
has become more level, at least for the two principal parties, but the 
Conservatives have retained an advantage at General Elections. Of course, if 
elected, this allows for the advantages of incumbency.   
 
Hypotheses and methodology 
The general problem to be tested is whether a party‟s annual expenditure can 
influence its annual popularity in opinion polls. The models employed are based 
upon the work of Johnston et al (Johnston, 1985; Johnston, 1986; Johnston & 
Pattie 1995; Pattie, Johnston & Fieldhouse, 1995)
3
 and Jacobson (Jacobson, 
1980; Jacobson, 1990). Thus, the hypothesis is that electoral popularity is 
function of party spending, spending by the principal opponent and existing party 
strength. 
 
POLL =  + 1PS + 2PE - 3OPE + e  (Model 1) 
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Where:  is the constant; POLL is the share of the poll for Party a; PS is the 
electoral strength of  Party a (Measured here by the poll rating one year 
previously); PE is expenditure by Party a; OPE is expenditure by Party b; e is 
the error term; 1-3 are regression coefficients. In this model, the expectation is 
that PE and PS will be positively signed, suggesting that a party‟s expenditure 
and  its existing electoral strength will have a positive effect on its vote share. 
Conversely, the expectation is that OPE will be negatively signed, suggesting 
that spending by the principal opponent will have a negative impact.  
 
Analysing national level spending presents some methodological difficulties, 
however. First, there is no pre-defined campaign period. Spending is not 
regulated and unlike at local level, parties are not required to submit returns for 
campaign expenditure. Second, as with all analyses of spending, one cannot 
adequately control for „non-partisan‟ political campaigning. For example, during 
the 1992 General Election, the public-sector union NALGO mounted a strong 
anti-Conservative campaign, which took out more press advertisements than the 
Conservatives and Liberal Democrats combined. However, since the union was 
not affiliated to the Labour Party and since the campaign did not explicitly 
endorse any party, there are methodological problems in measuring the positive 
effects at least of such campaigns. This is a common problem. Gidlund notes that 
in Sweden, despite the fact that the Liberal party had sought to limit corporate 
income and the Conservative Party eliminate it completely, corporate donations 
continued to be made to business groups which ran nominally independent political 
campaigns for which the political support was plain. Moreover, this form of support 
is in a state of rapid development (Gidlund, 1991). Such developments have also in 
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the past been evident with the rise of corporate PACs in the USA, and in the past in 
West Germany, Norway and Japan (Nassmacher, 1993, p. 253). 
 
This analysis however, is able to compensate for the first problem and partially so 
for the second by examining party performance on an annual basis. Since political 
parties do not only operate in electoral cycles but as more of a constant, we can 
alleviate difficulties presented by the absence of  pre-defined campaign periods.
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Secondly, whilst we cannot entirely control for „non-partisan‟ effects, this analysis 
can at least assess whether the standing of parties can be affected on a year-on-year 
basis by the amounts that parties spend. Non-partisan spending by way of contrast is 
more likely to be concentrated at the time of key - usually general - elections. 
 
Jacobson‟s key assumption, however as we have seen is that campaign spending 
will be of greater significance for challengers rather than incumbents. On this 
basis, he hypothesises that the amount spent by challengers will have a greater 
impact on the outcome of an election than that spent by incumbents, controlling 
for incumbent‟s expenditure and the previous electoral strength of the challenger. 
The changes to the basic model are then as follows: 
 
CP =  + 1CPS + 2CE - 3IE + e  (Model 2) 
 
Where:  is the constant; CP is challenger‟s share of the poll; CPS is the 
electoral strength of the challenger (Measured here by the poll rating one year 
previously); CE is the challenger‟s expenditure; IE is the incumbent‟s 
expenditure; e is the error term; 1-3 are regression coefficients. In this model, the 
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expectation is that CE and CPS will be positively signed, suggesting that the 
challenging party‟s expenditure and its existing electoral strength will have a 
positive effect on its vote share. Conversely, the expectation is that IE will be 
negatively signed, suggesting that spending by the incumbent party will have a 
negative impact.  
 
The equation is then reformulated to examine whether expenditure is less 
important for incumbents. It also allows us to examine the claims of both Green 
and Krasno (1988,1990) and Gerber (1998) that incumbent expenditure will be 
more likely to yield electoral payoffs.  
 
IP =  + 1IPS + 2IE - 3CE + e  (Model 3) 
 
Where:  is the constant; IP is incumbent‟s share of the poll; IPS is the electoral 
strength of the incumbent (Measured here by the poll rating one year previously); 
IE is the incumbent‟s expenditure; CE is the challenger‟s expenditure; e is the 
error term; 1-3 are regression coefficients. In this model, the expectation is that 
IE and IPS will be positively signed, suggesting that the incumbent party‟s 
expenditure and its existing electoral strength will have a positive effect on its 
vote share. Conversely, the expectation is that CE will be negatively signed, 
suggesting that spending by the challenging party will have a negative impact.  
 
If these data were cross-sectional, a common procedure to differentiate the 
effects of opposition and incumbency would be to simply divide the data by 
those criteria and compare regressions. However, the use of time-series presents 
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a problem since splitting  the data entails interrupting the time-series. One 
solution to this problem is to employ an intercept dummy variable to denote 
incumbency or opposition, together with a dummy interaction variable. This is 
produced by multiplying the dummy variable by the relevant explanatory 
variable and captures differences in the slope (Gujarati, 1992, pp 260-78). By 
using these techniques, problems of interrupted time-series are avoided.
5
 
 
Since parties produce accounts annually, there is no way of ascertaining whether 
certain periods of the year generate more income than others. For this reason, all 
the data are taken as a yearly figure, or, where more frequent time intervals 
occur, a mean for the calendar year is produced.
6
 Since the time period is 
relatively long, there is no need to build lags into the models as the period of one 
year provides a sufficient internal lag. The following variables are used: 
Conservative central expenditure in real terms (standardised at 1963 prices by 
the RPI); Conservative opinion poll rating; Labour central expenditure in real 
terms (standardised at 1963 prices by the RPI); Labour opinion poll rating.
7
 
 
For all analyses, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is employed. Since the models 
include a lagged endogenous variable (poll rating one year previously), the 
problem of autocorrelation can be alleviated. In all tables, unstandardised 
regression coefficients are reported together with t statistics and their associated 
levels of significance. 
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RESULTS 
The results for Model 1 are illustrated in Table 1. This covers the whole period 
for both parties. Taking the impact on Conservative poll ratings, Conservative 
expenditure is correctly signed as having a positive impact and Labour spending 
is correctly signed as negative. Neither parameters however are statistically 
significant. For Labour poll ratings, neither expenditure variables has any 
discernible impact, confirmed by the fact that both fail to reach statistical 
significance. Only previous electoral strength provides any significant effect in 
either model. Thus, without controls for incumbency or challenge, it seems that 
increased party spending may not be effective.  
 
[Table 1 About Here] 
 
In tables 2 and 3, the impact of spending is analysed according the status of the 
parties as incumbents or opposition as described in Models 2 and 3. Dummy 
intercept and dummy interaction  variables are employed to denote party status. 
For example the following model is employed to examine periods of 
Conservative incumbency: 
 
CONPOLLt =  + 1CONPOLLt-1 + 2Dt + 3CONEXPt - 4LABEXPt + 
5(Dt*CONEXPt) - 6 (Dt*LABEXPt) + et 
 
Where:  is the constant; CONPOLLt is Conservative poll ratings; CONPOLLt-1 
is Conservative poll ratings lagged by one year; Dt is the dummy intercept term 
(1=Conservative incumbent and 0=Conservative opposition); CONEXPt is 
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Conservative real terms expenditure; LABEXPt is Labour real terms expenditure; 
(Dt*CONEXPt)is the interaction variable of CONEXPt multiplied by Dt; 
(Dt*LABEXPt  )is the interaction variable of LABEXPt multiplied by Dt; et is the 
error term; 1-6 are regression coefficients. The same form of model is then run 
on Labour poll ratings. Results are reported for both opposition and incumbency 
for ease of interpretation.  
 
Table 2 illustrates the effects of spending by both parties on Conservative poll 
ratings during periods of Conservative opposition and incumbency. During 
periods of Conservative opposition, Labour spending is correctly signed as 
having a negative effect upon Conservative poll ratings. Conservative spending 
is however, incorrectly signed, suggesting that as the Conservative Party 
increases its spending in opposition, it performs less well in the opinion polls - a 
counter-intuitive finding. Both parameters however, fail to reach statistical 
significance. 
 
The results in Table 2 do, however indicate that increased spending by the 
Conservative Party when it is the incumbent does appear to improve poll ratings, 
though that effect is small. All other variables remaining equal, an increase in 
spending of £1,000 per annum at 1963 prices (£10,560 at 1994 prices) would 
produce a 0.004% increase in Conservative poll ratings. Spending by Labour in 
opposition is also correctly signed, suggesting that an increase in Labour 
spending hinders the Conservatives. This parameter is not however, statistically 
significant. 
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[Table 2 About Here] 
 
Table 3 illustrates the effects of spending by both parties on Labour poll ratings. 
When Labour is in opposition, Conservative expenditure is correctly signed as 
having a negative impact upon Labour poll ratings but is not statistically 
significant. Labour‟s spending is incorrectly negatively signed as having a 
negative impact on Labour poll ratings. This is counter-intuitive but again, it is 
not statistically significant. When Labour is the incumbent party, its expenditure 
is correctly signed, suggesting a positive impact. Conservative spending in 
opposition is however, incorrectly signed as also having a positive impact. That 
said, neither parameters are statistically significant. Overall, expenditure by 
either party does not appear to affect Labour‟s poll ratings. 
 
Thus, it appears that the central thrust of Jacobson‟s findings - that challenger 
spending is most significant - does not hold in these scenarios. Challenger 
spending fails to reach statistical significance in both sets of estimations. Model 
3 does however produce estimates which fit the broad hypothesis, namely that in 
periods of Conservative incumbency at least, the party is marginally more 
popular when it spends more money. This is consistent with both Green and 
Krasno and Gerber‟s assertions that it is incumbent rather than challenger 
spending which is most likely to yield electoral payoffs. That said, this finding 
does not hold however in periods of Labour incumbency. 
 
[Table 3 About Here] 
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An initial overall interpretation of these results might be therefore, that spending 
at national level had little demonstrable electoral impact. There are, however, 
certain factors which should be borne in mind. First, the analysis attempted to 
control for non-partisan campaigning by examining electoral or poll success on a 
year on year basis; the logic being that non-partisan campaigning of significance 
tends to occur at the times of general elections. However, it cannot wholly 
eliminate these effects, nor can it control for partisanship within the press which 
though heightened at general elections, still continues throughout the electoral 
„cycle‟. This is a potential problem, since press and media coverage can affect 
parties‟ abilities to promote their message. Opinion is divided upon the electoral 
effects of the press (see, for example Curtice & Semetko, 1994). Nevertheless 
estimates have been made which suggest that „party funding in kind‟ can 
potentially be significant. One such estimate utilises Precis, a technique 
developed in the United States and used by Ross Perot in 1992. The technique 
assesses not just column inches, but the size and position of articles as well as 
assessments of their positivity or negativity for the client (in this case political 
parties). Using this technique, Linton estimates that favourable newspaper coverage 
in the 1992 General Election was worth £16 million to the Conservatives and £5 
million to Labour (Linton, 1994, pp. 29-31). If this technique is reliable, then of 
course the models tested here do not incorporate this additional „expenditure‟. 
 
Yet in spite of these potential drawbacks, the results may well illustrate a very 
real phenomenon, namely that resources and party expenditure are not a constant 
sum. Despite that fact that parties spend different amounts, they may also do so 
with differing degrees of skill and effectiveness. The results should not be 
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interpreted as implying that national party expenditure makes little or no 
difference to electoral outcomes; clearly a party that spent nothing would be 
likely to fare badly. It is simply to suggest that expenditure differentials per se 
may not be as critical as is often argued (Linton, 1994; Ewing, 1992), since 
parties, like any other organisation or individual will use money with varying 
degrees of skill. After all, in anecdotal terms, whilst Labour spent less than the 
Conservatives in the 1987 general election, it was generally judged to have 
„won‟ the campaign. It lost the election. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The results reported here suggest that increased party expenditure can have a 
positive effect, but that this is difficult to show on a consistent basis. Certainly, it 
would appear that the Conservatives can help maintain their national profile 
when in government (measured by opinion polls) by increasing party 
expenditure. Overall however, it appears that the case suggesting that national 
party expenditure has a positive effect on electoral fortunes is difficult to sustain. 
That said, the data are limited to an extent by the fact that they need to be taken 
as an annual observation. This means that we cannot capture shorter term 
electoral effects of increases in party spending. Moreover, annual data restricts 
the number of observations. For those reasons, some caution at least should be 
registered. However, the results here are indicative and do suggest that party 
spending at national level may not be as effective in electoral terms as is often 
suggested.
8
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A consequence of this is that the commonly argued case for state funding; that of 
a „level electoral playing field‟, is more difficult in empirical terms to justify. 
Notwithstanding the added problems of attempting to enforce ceilings upon 
national expenditure, these results indicate that between the main two British 
parties at least, the advantage of increased national party expenditure is unclear. 
That is not to say, of course, that state funding of parties is undesirable - merely 
that disparities in national party expenditure may not provide a convincing case 
for its extended adoption. 
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Figure 1 
Conservative and Labour Central Expenditure (Real Terms) 1959-1994 
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Figure 2 
Labour Expenditure as a Percentage of Conservative Expenditure 1959-
1994 
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Table 1 
 
The Impact of Spending on Conservative and Labour Poll Ratings  
Model 1 
 
 Conservative Poll Labour Poll 
 b t p b t p 
Constant 12.159 (1.551)  12.991 (1.839) * 
Poll Rating t-1 0.666 (4.056) *** 0.664 (4.010) *** 
Conservative Expenditure 0.003 (1.487)  0.001 (0.323)  
Labour Expenditure -0.004 (-1.271)  0.000 (0.087)  
Adjusted r2  0.407   0.348  
Durbin-Watson   1.358   1.553  
n = 35       
 
*** significant at 0.01 level 
** significant at 0.05 level 
* significant at 0.1 level 
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Table 2 
 
The Impact of Spending on Conservative Poll Ratings Controlling for Status 
 
 
 Conservative Opposition - 
Model 2 
Conservative Incumbent - 
Model 3 
 b t p b t p 
Constant 7.731 (1.164)  25.365 (3.290)  *** 
Poll Rating t-1 0.657 (4.763) *** 0.657 (4.763)  *** 
Incumbency/Opposition Dummy 17.635 (3.456) *** -17.635 (-1.329)  *** 
Conservative Opposition Expenditure -0.004 (-1.456)   x x  
Labour Incumbent Expenditure -0.008 (-1.127)   x x  
Conservative Incumbent Expenditure x x  0.004 (2.402) ** 
Labour Opposition Expenditure x x  -0.002 (-0.593)  
Adjusted r2  0.589   0.589  
Durbin-Watson  1.334   1.334  
n = 35       
 
 
*** significant at 0.01 level 
** significant at 0.05 level 
* significant at 0.1 level 
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 Table 3 
 
The Impact of Spending on Labour Poll Ratings Controlling for Status 
 
 
 Labour Opposition -  
Model 2 
Labour Incumbent - 
Model 3 
 b t p b t p 
Constant 3.071 (0.346)  14.617 (2.058) ** 
Poll Rating t-1 0.687 (4.182) *** 0.687 (4.182) *** 
Incumbency/Opposition Dummy 11.546 (1.925) * -11.546 (-1.925) * 
Labour Opposition Expenditure -0.001 (0.166)  x x  
Conservative Incumbent Expenditure -0.000 (-0.218)  x x  
Labour Incumbent Expenditure x x  0.007 (0.793)  
Conservative Opposition Expenditure x x  0.005 (1.373)  
Adjusted r2  0.368   0.368  
Durbin-Watson   1.407   1.407  
n = 35       
 
 
*** significant at 0.01 level 
** significant at 0.05 level 
* significant at 0.1 level 
     25 
REFERENCES 
 
Adamany, D.W. & Agree, G.E. (1975)  Political Money. Baltimore, John Hopkins 
University Press. 
Alexander, H.E. (1984) Financing Politics. Washington, CQ Press. 
Alexander, H. (1989) Money and politics: rethinking a conceptual framework. In 
Comparative Political Finance in the 1980s, ed. Alexander, H., pp. 9-23. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Butler, D & Butler, G. (1994) British Political Facts 1900-1994. London, 
MacMillan. 
Curtice, J. & Semetko, H. (1994) Does it matter what the papers say? In Labour’s 
Last Chance? eds. Heath, A. Jowell, R. &  Curtice, J., pp. 43-63.  Aldershot, 
Dartmouth. 
Denver, D. & Hands, H. (1997) Challengers, Incumbents and the Impact of 
Constituency Campaigning in Britain. Electoral Studies, 16,175-193, 
Downs, A. (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York, Harper and 
Row. 
Ewing, K. (1992) Money, Politics & Law. Oxford, Clarendon Press. 
Fisher, J. (1996a) British Political Parties. Hemel Hempstead, Prentice Hall. 
Fisher, J. (1996b) Party Finance. In The Conservative Party,  ed. Norton, P., pp. 
157-169. Hemel Hempstead, Prentice Hall. 
Gerber, A. (1998) Estimating the Effect of Campaign Spending on Senate Election 
Outcomes Using Instrumental Variables. American Political Science Review 92, 
401-412. 
     26 
Gidlund, G. (1991) The nature of public financing in Nordic states. In The Public 
Purse and Political Parties, ed. Wiberg, M., pp. 173-186.  Helsinki, Finnish 
Political Science Association. 
Green, D.P. & Krasno, J.S. (1988) Salvation for the Spendthrift Incumbent: 
Reestimating the Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections. American 
Journal of Political Science 32, 884-907. 
Green, D.P. & Krasno, J.S. (1990) Rebuttal to Jacobson‟s “New Evidence for 
Old Arguments”. American Journal of Political Science 34, 363-372. 
Gujarati, D. (1992) Essentials of Econometrics. Singapore, McGraw Hill. 
Jacobson, G.C. (1980) Money in Congressional Elections. New Haven, Yale 
University Press). 
Jacobson, G.C. (1990) The Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections: 
New Evidence for Old Arguments. American Journal of Political Science, 34, 
334-362. 
Johnston R. & Pattie, C. (1995) The Impact of Spending on Party Constituency 
Campaigns in Recent British General Elections. Party Politics 1, 261-273. 
Johnston, R.J. (1985) The Geography of English Politics. London, Croom Helm. 
Johnston, R.J. (1986) A Further Look at British Political Finance. Political 
Studies 34, 466-473. 
Laver, M. (1997) Private Desires, Political Action. London, Sage. 
Linton, M. (1994) Money and Votes. London, IPPR. 
Nassmacher, K.H. (1993) Comparing Party and Campaign Finance in Western 
Democracies. In Campaign and Party Finance in North America and Western 
Europe, ed.  Gunlicks, A.B., pp. 233-267. Boulder, Westview Press. 
     27 
Paltiel, K.Z. (1981) Campaign Finance: Contrasting Practices and Reforms. In 
Democracy at the Polls, eds. Butler, D., Penniman, H.R. & Ranney, A., pp.138-
173. Washington, American Enterprise Institute. 
Panebianco, A. (1988) Political Parties. Organization and Power. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press 
Pattie, C, Johnston, R & Fieldhouse, E. (1995) Winning the Local Vote: The 
Effectiveness of Constituency Campaign Spending in Britain, 1983-1992. 
American Political Science Review. 89, 969-983. 
Pinto-Duschinsky, M. (1981) British Political Finance 1830-1980. London, 
American Enterprise Institute. 
Pinto-Duschinsky, M. (1985) Trends in British Political Funding 1979-1983 
Parliamentary Affairs. 38, 329-347. 
Pinto-Duschinsky, M. (1989) Trends in British Party Funding 1983-1987. 
Parliamentary Affairs. 42, 197-212. 
     28 
 
                                                 
1  I am most grateful for the valuable advice provided by both the anonymous referees and 
the editors in the preparation of this article. 
2  It appears from the graph that Labour spending outstripped that of the Conservatives in 
1992. The reason for this is that the Conservative financial year has run to the end of 
March since 1967 whereas Labour‟s runs to the end of December. For comparison, 
therefore, Conservative spending is classified as being in the year in which the financial 
year is largely concerned. For example, the financial year 1991/92 is classified as being 
1991 since 9 months fell in that year. Thus, much of the spending by the Conservatives 
in the run-up to the 1992 election is classified as having taken place in 1991. 
3  Johnston & Pattie (1995) calculate the dependent variable as the share of the two party 
vote, rather than vote share overall. All estimates were run using both vote share and 
share of the two party vote i.e. Labour share of Conservative + Labour. The results were 
almost identical. 
4  Although party spending is continual, it is nevertheless clear that it peaks at the time of 
General Elections. It has been suggested, therefore that a dummy variable be included in 
the models to capture election year effects. This is problematic since there is no defined 
point at which election spending begins. The impact of the dummy variable would 
therefore be unpredictable. Nevertheless, the models were tested with such a dummy 
variable, but its inclusion had no substantive impact upon the results. 
5  When interaction terms are used in regression analysis, problems of collinearity 
amongst independent variables sometimes arise (See Denver & Hands, 1997, p.192). In 
order to check the reliability of the analysis, the data were split into relevant periods of 
incumbency and opposition. The results were virtually identical, indicating that the 
findings using the intercept dummy variable and dummy interaction variable are 
reliable. 
6  Since the data are taken as an annual observation, incumbency is defined by the party 
being in government for the greater proportion of the calendar year. 
7  The sources of these data are, Butler & Butler (1994), Fisher (1996a;1996b), Gallup and 
Pinto-Duschinsky (1981; 1985; 1989). 
8  Aggregate control variables of alternative predictors of party support have not been used 
in this analysis. The reason for this is twofold. First, the analysis seeks to establish 
whether spending could potentially have an impact. As the results show, this is 
generally not the case. Secondly, the most obvious aggregate control variable, personal 
economic evaluations, cannot be used as that time series only commences in 1974. Since 
there is no consistent empirical evidence that objective economic indicators are useful 
over this entire period, it was decided not to include them. 
